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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional Law-Custody Requirement for Federal
Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant the writ of habeas
corpus is available in five situations.1 An overwhelming number
of habeas corpus petitions are filed pursuant to the requirement that
the petitioner be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."'2 It is evident from the
express wording of the statute and from judicial declaration' that
custody is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the federal courts' power
to hear and determine the constitutional claims presented in a habeas
corpus petition.
The custody requirement is not limited to but can be something
less than incarceration4 and is "something more than moral re-
straint."' Outside the fact of actual incarceration, it has been held
that a person released on parole,' or probation' satisfies the custody
requirement. In Jones v. Cunningham,' the Supreme Court, hold-
ing that a state parolee was "in custody," equated custody with any
significant restraint on a person's liberty "to do those things which
in this country free men are entitled to do." 9 This decision provided
the lower federal courts with a flexible formula to apply in de-
termining whether the extent and character of a particular restraint
on liberty constitutes "custody."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, recently applied the Jones rationale in Martin v.
Virginia.1" The petitioner escaped while serving a concededly valid
'28 U.S.C. 2241(c) (1964).
2 28 U.S.C. 2241(c) (3) (1964). Habeas corpus petitions filed by state
prisoners in federal district courts increased from 1,903 to 3,531, or 85.5%,
from the 1963 to the 1964 fiscal year. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443,
453 n.8 (1965), citing ANN REP. OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs, p. 46 (1964).
:Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963).
'See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
'Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
'Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964). The present
Supreme Court rule is that a person is not in custody who has been released
on bail. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920). There is a split on
this issue in the circuit courts. Compare Bates v. Bates, 141 F.2d 723
(D.C. Cir. 1944), with Rowland v. Arkansas, 179 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1950).
8371 U.S. 236 (1963), noted in 51 CALIF. L. REv. 228 (1963), 17
RUTGERS L. REv. 808 (1963), 48 VA. L. REv. 112 (1963).
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
10349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
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fifteen-year sentence for murder. He was subsequently convicted
for escape and grand larceny and sentenced to terms of five and
three years respectively. Petitioner contended that these convictions
were constitutionally defective because he had been denied counsel
of his own choosing and the effective assistance of court-appointed
counsel. According to Virginia law, the latter sentences, in addi-
tion to the valid sentence, were to be considered in computing
petitioner's parole eligibility. As a result of this rule, his parole
eligibility was automatically deferred for three years. Petitioner es-
tablished that the parole board would look with favor upon his
parole application if the latter convictions were set aside. The court
held that the petitioner was "in custody" and therefore entitled to
a hearing on his petition attacking the validity of the sentences to
take effect in the future.
The court expressly rejected the Supreme Court ruling in Mc-
Nally v. Hill," that habeas corpus is not available to attack a future
sentence when the petitioner is serving a valid sentence. It reasoned
that the decisions of Jones v. Cunningham12 and Fay v. Noia 3
provided "reasonable ground for thinking that were the Supreme
Court faced with the issue today, it might well reconsider McNally
and hold that a denial of eligibility for parole is a 'restraint of
liberty' no less substantial than the technical restraint of parole." 4
Martin raises two distinct, but interrelated, questions with re-
spect to the "custody" requirement. First, is the adverse effect of
the second sentence upon the petitioner's parole eligibility a sufficient
restraint upon his liberty to constitute custody? Second, is the attack
on the second conviction premature and hence "moot" in the sense
that the petitioner would still be confined under a valid conviction,
even if the second conviction is set aside?' 5
In McNally, the Court looked to the common law and derived
the rule that a sentence to be served in the future in no way affects
the lawfulness of the detention under a valid first sentence and that
11293 U.S. 131 (1934).
U371 U.S. 236 (1963).
372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78 (1964);
Comment, 42 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1964). See generally Bator, Finality in
Criminal and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HRv. L.
REv. 441 (1963); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive
State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1961).
1"349 F.2d at 783-84.
1' See SOKoL, FEDEAL HA EAS CoRPus §§ 5.3, 6 (1965).
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"without restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used."10
The McNally test for habeas corpus was one of immediate release
from present physical detention, and, since a successful attack on
the second sentence would not produce this result, habeas corpus
was not available." In Ex Parte Hull,18 the Court carved out an
exception to McNally by permitting attack on a future sentence
that was the sole cause of the petitioner's parole revocation and re-
commitment to prison under a prior valid conviction. The Court
distinguished McNally by reasoning that an immediate declaration
of the invalidity of the second sentence would enable the petitioner
to regain his former parole status, rather than to be subject to
continued incarceration under a valid sentence as in McNally.
The McNally rule is firmly entrenched in federal case law,1'
and as late as 1959 the Supreme Court indicated that it still sub-
scribes to the rule."0 The McNally rule is generally considered a
test of mootness in the sense that an attack on a second sentence is
premature as long as there remains time to be served under a valid
sentence.2
In Martin, it is clear that the court was primarily concerned
with the custody requirement and did not consider the mootness
problem presented by McNally. Relying heavily upon the Jones
rationale, the court reasoned that the "subsequent convictions which
cause the vast difference between continued confinement without
eligibility for consideration for parole and conditional release are in
the truest sense a present restraint upon ... [petitioner's] liberty,
22
and "that a denial of eligibility for parole is a 'restraint of liberty'
no less substantial than the technical restraint of parole."23
16 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934).
" The purpose of the proceeding ... [is] to inquire into the legality
of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized . . . [is] the
discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if
his detention were found to be unlawful.
Id. at 136-37.
18 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
"'E.g., Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941); Wilson v. Gray, 345
F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3172 (U.S. Nov.
16, 1965); Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964); Osborne
v. Taylor, 328 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1964); Holland v. Gladden, 226 F.
Supp. 654 (D. Ore. 1963); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Banmiller, 187
F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
20 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 (1959).
21 See SoxoL, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 6.




The Martin decision establishes a distinct modification of the
"release from custody" test set out by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Nally. Under the Martin rationale, a successful habeas corpus pro-
ceeding need only result in the petitioner's release from the restraints
on his liberty, and not his immediate release from actual physical
restraint. Conceptually, the restraints in Martin are but one form
of custody, and relief from them necessarily results in a "form of
discharge from custody. "24
The total effect of this form of relief from custody is to render
the petitioner eligible to be considered for parole in the same man-
ner as he would have been had the second sentences not been im-
posed. There is a very strong argument that since parole is a matter
of legislative grace,2 exercised through the sole discretion of state
parole boards,2" the federal district courts should summarily dis-
miss habeas corpus petitions in cases such as Martin because there
is no assurance that the petitioner will be granted parole." Further-
more, the state has a viable interest in the enforcement of its penal
laws and may desire to retry the petitioner. A retrial does not
expose the petitioner to former jeopardy,"s and a valid conviction
effectively diminishes the petitioner's eligibility for parole. Whether
or not a state elects to grant parole or to deny it or to retry the
petitioner would, of course, vary from case to case depending upon
the individual petitioner's record. The court anticipated this prob-
lem and recognized the possibility that future courts might limit
Martin to its facts and require the petitioner to show that he will
be favorably considered for parole. This possibility was negated
2'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963).
See Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964), where it was stated
that "freedom, on parole from confinement in a penal institution prior to
serving all of an imposed sentence, is a matter of legislative grace-it is
neither a constitutionally guaranteed nor a God-given right." Id. at 874.
2" The West Virginia statute illustrates this point: "The board of proba-
tion and parole, whenever it shall be of the opinion that the best interests
of the state and the prisoner will be subserved thereby, . . . shall have author-
ity to release any such prisoner on parole for such terms and upon such
conditions as are provided by.... [statute]." W. VA. CODE AxN. § 6291(20)
(1961). (Emphasis added.)
"' The court in Martin assumed that the Virginia Parole Board would
not substantially penalize the petitioner for his escape. But see the VA.
CODE ANN. § 53-227 (1958), which provides that "in case a prisoner at-
tempts to escape or leaves, without permission, the State penitentiary . ..
he shall, upon being recaptured or taken, lose all his accumulated time."
(Emphasis added.)
8 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
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when the court expressly stated that the principle of custody applied
by it to permit attack on a future sentence was not "limited to
one... who is able to state a strong case for parole consideration."2
The decision in Martin appears to be sound on three grounds.
First, Martin's designation of denial of parole eligibility as custody
is but a logical extension of the Jones formula equating parole with
custody. The only difference between the restraints on liberty in
the two cases is one of degree and not substance. In each case the
petitioner has a distinct interest in procuring his release from cus-
tody. Second, a present attack on these convictions appears to be
more practical because it lessens the possibilities that witnesses will
die or move away or that the record of the case will become "cold."
If the McNally rule had been followed in Martin, the second sen-
tences could not have been attacked until they had been imple-
mented." Third, the rationale of Martin is in harmony with the
trend of the Supreme Court's progressive motions 81 as to the scope
and purpose of habeas corpus to protect "individuals against erosion
of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty.
312
It is implicit in the Martin decision that the Fourth Circuit
recognizes the importance of parole, in contrast to continued confine-
ment, as a means of rehabilitating a prisoner, and that the possibility
of his being extended the privilege of parole is a protectable inter-
est of the petitioner who is being denied it because of an invalid
future sentence. Whether the states,"3 in the administration of their
post-conviction procedures, the other circuits, 4 or the Supreme
349 F.2d at 784.8o See SoxoL, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 6.
*' See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
8 3The states of New York, Oregon, and Maryland presently permit an
attack on a sentence to be served in the future. 349 F.2d at 784 n.2. It is
reasonable to infer from the very broad language of the North Carolina
post-conviction statute that it is permissible to attack a sentence to be
served in the future. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1965). See Note, 44 N.C.L.
IEv. 153 (1965).
" But see Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
34 U.S.L. WEEK 3172 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1965), where the petitioner was
denied relief under the McNally and Hull rules. However this case is dis-
tinguishable from Martin in that the immediate invalidation of the second
sentence would not have entitled petitioner to immediate release from in-
carceration, nor would it have rendered him eligible for parole.
[Vol. 44
INSIDER TRANSACTIONS
Court follow the lead in Martin is yet to be seen. It is hoped that
neither the technical requirement of McNally that petitioner be re-
leased from physical custody, nor the states' discretionary power to
deny parole or retry petitioner, will be utilized as a jurisdictional
barrier to prevent federal district courts from determining the
validity of sentences to be served in the future.
C. RALPH KINSEY, JR.
Corporations-"Profit Realized" In Section 16(b)-
Insider Transactions
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., owner of more than ten per cent of the
stock of the plaintiff corporation, bought 32,000 additional shares
for a Gamble-Skogmo employees' trust fund.' Only 25,942 of those
shares were transferred to the fund, however, and the remaining
shares were retained by the purchaser. Within six months of this
purchase, Gamble-Skogmo sold' all of its stock in the plaintiff ex-
cept that held by the trust fund. Plaintiff sought recovery of
Gamble-Skogmo's "profits" on all 32,000 shares under section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 Only the profit made on
the 6,058 retained shares was paid, and plaintiff sued for the prof-
its4 that would have been realized had the 25,942 shares in the
trust fund been included in the short-swing transaction. The district
'Gamble-Skogmo was not required to make its contribution to the trust
fund in Western Auto stock, or in any other stock for that matter. Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
2 The sale was pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. United States
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., Civil No. 12776, W.D. Mo., July 18, 1960.
"48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See 44 N.C.L. REv.
835 n.3 (1966) for the full text of the statute. See generally 2 Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATIONS 1040-90 (2d ed. 1961); Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958) ; Cook & Feld-
man, Insider Trading Under the Recurities Exchange Act (pts. 1 & 2), 66
HARv. L. Rv. 385, 612 (1963); Painter, The Evolving Role of Section
16(b), 62 MIcH. L. REv. 649 (1964); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibi-
tions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 468 (1947). At the time their articles were written, Mr. Cook was
Chairman, and Mr. Feldman, Special Council, of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, though they did not purport to be speaking on behalf
of the Commission.
'The profit was calculated at $3.65 per share, a total of $116,800.00,
based on the difference between the price per share paid for the 32,000
shares and the price per share received when all 1,262,102 shares were sold.
Also, two dividends of $.35 per share, paid on the stock before the short-
swing sale, were included,
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